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Cu r r en t  a f f a i r s
The scandal following the revelation of the use ofmelamine, which causes acute kidney problems, inthe production of milk powder created one of the
greatest health crises in contemporary China. Since the
SARS epidemic in 2003, the Chinese government has been
particularly keen to deal with such questions in the field of
public health. (1) This has given the population at large an
opportunity to voice their legitimate concerns, usually forbid-
den in the strictly political field, by raising the question of
responsibility at the highest levels. How could the Chinese
government have allowed such a toxic contaminant to enter
the supply lines of the milk trade? The foreign media seized
on the affair to make a further dig at the “Made in China”
label, which had already been damaged by a scandal over
lead-tainted Mattel toys. Internationally, the criticism was no
longer levelled at the government alone, but at the whole cul-
ture of fraud in China.
This crisis, in its general outlines, in the course of its devel-
opment, and in the breadth of its potential consequences, is
very similar to the “contaminated blood affair” that shook
the socialist government in France in the early 1990s and led
to one of the most notorious trials of the Fifth Republic. (2)
But we know that similar contamination occurred in the
blood transfusion and distribution channels in Henan
Province without that local scandal leading to a full-blown
affair involving accusations against the political leadership. (3)
The real question, therefore, should not be put in terms of
immediate emotional response from the public, but at quite
a different level. How could an apparently minor industry in
China (the manufacture of milk products) have led to a
health crisis, while revelations concerning contaminated
blood had no such effect?
The following argument is based on my reading of articles
about the scandal, from its uncovering in September 2008 to
the trial of the Sanlu directors in January 2009, and on an
anthropological hypothesis that has been tested in the light
of other health crises. My main sources are reports in the
South China Morning Post (SCMP) throughout the period
in question, supplemented by several opinion polls in the
French and Chinese media. These reveal three separate
stages: the uncovering of the scandal, the enquiry into food
safety standards, and the problematic legal resolution.
T he  s canda l  is  unco ve re d
Every health crisis begins with a whistleblower. (4) In the
case of the contaminated milk affair, this role was played by
the Fonterra milk products company. On 5 September
2008, this Auckland-based company informed the New
Zealand government that there were health problems linked
to the powdered milk produced by China’s Sanlu Group, in
which it held 43 percent of the shares: more than a thousand
children had developed kidney stones after ingesting the
product, and two babies had died. Helen Clark, the Prime
Minister of New Zealand, responded by requesting that the
Chinese government withdraw the defective products from
the market. (5) In fact, this public revelation at the highest
level had followed a whole series of unsuccessful warnings.
Back in March 2008, some consumers had complained that
their children were falling ill after being fed Sanlu powdered
milk, and many blogs had spread that information. On 2
August, Fonterra had warned the city authorities in
Shijiazhuang, where the Sanlu company is based, of the
need to recall the products. It was only when the scandal
erupted on the international scene, however, that it had any
repercussions in China. In the week following the alert on 5
September, the scandal escalated to ever higher levels until
the Ministry of Health forced Sanlu to recall all its prod-
ucts. (6)
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F R É D É R I C  K E C K
1. See Alain Guilloux’s summaries of publications on this question in Perspectives
Chinoises nos. 92 and 99, and my own in the 2007/4 issue.
2. In the French and English language media, the milk was referred to as “contaminated”
just as frequently as “tainted.” The former expression had the advantage of not insist-
ing so much on the more or less intentional causes behind the poisoning as on its
effects, which extend to the “contamination” of every aspect of social life. That is why
this article retains the same term. 
3. On the distinction between a scandal and an affair, see Luc Boltanski, Elisabeth Claverie,
Nicolas Offenstadt, and Stéphane Van Damme, Affaires, scandales et grandes causes:
de Socrate à Pinochet, Paris, Stock, 2007. There is a scandal when the media seize on
an issue to present it to public opinion and denounce an injustice; this becomes an
“affair” when this cause manages to involve an increasing number of active supporters,
leading to a trial in which they are all in the limelight (such as in the “Dreyfus affair”).
4. See F. Chateauraynaud and D. Torny, Les Sombres Précurseurs: une sociologie pragma-
tique de l’alerte et du risque, Paris, EHESS, 1999.
5. On the strategies of companies that decide to withdraw their products in the face of a
health crisis, see J. Besançon, O. Borraz, and C. Grandclément-Chaffy, La sécurité alimen-
taire en crises: les crises Coca-Cola et Listeria en 1999-2000, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004.
6. South China Morning Post (hereafter SCMP), 17 September 2008, “Officials knew of
tainted milk for a month.”
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At that point, the Chinese and international media began to
raise questions about the nature of the toxic element in the
powdered milk. (7) Melamine is a chemical compound
(C3H6N6) derived from urea. Developed during the
1930s, it possesses a number of properties that make it indis-
pensable to industry, particularly in the production of plas-
tics. It is present in very low doses in all drinks on the mar-
ket through transmission from plastic containers to their con-
tents. It is only when high doses are taken regularly that it
can badly affect the kidneys, however, because in low doses
it is easily eliminated. Since China is the largest melamine
producer in the world, it is easy to see how excess produc-
tion could find a ready outlet in the milk industry; milk pro-
ducers had become accustomed to diluting their products
with water, and melamine has the effect of boosting the pro-
tein content in products being tested. This can certainly be
considered fraudulent, because melamine does not increase
the real nutritional value, but only the value measured by the
tests. Paradoxically, therefore, it was milk products with the
“highest nutritional content,“ recommended for children suf-
fering from malnourishment, that caused the cases of poison-
ing. (8)
The enquiry quickly revealed that the fraudulent use of
melamine was not restricted to the Sanlu Group, but was
common throughout China’s milk products industry due to
its close relations with other industries. (9) The responsibility
was first laid at Sanlu’s door, but it subsequently spread to
everyone in the chain of milk production. In the localities,
police caught milk producers in the act of adding
melamine. (10) Sanlu director Ms. Tian Wenhua resigned, as
did the vice-mayor of Shijiazhuang, Zhang Fawang. The
leaders of the major Chinese milk formula companies
(Mengniu and Yilin) mounted large public milk-drinking cer-
emonies in order to restore consumer confidence, while they
begged forgiveness for not noticing the acts of fraud. (11) The
director of the Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), Li Changjiang, was
forced to resign. (12) In Taiwan, the import of Chinese prod-
ucts raised sensitive questions. The Health Minister
resigned, and his successor was vehemently denounced by
demonstrators. (13) And at the international level, the organi-
sation Reporters Sans Frontières accused the director of the
World Health Organisation (WHO), Margaret Chan, who
had handled the avian flu and SARS crises at the
Department of Health in Hong Kong, of covering up the
scandal on behalf of the Chinese government. The WHO
replied that it had no control over milk products, (14) and went
on to criticise the outdated food safety provisions in
China. (15) More recently, a petition signed by Chinese
lawyers and academics criticised the official television chan-
nel CCTV for helping to suppress news of the melamine
scandal. By then, the contaminated milk scandal was involv-
ing too many players in the blame game; it was time to call
in the experts.T he  e nquir y into  foo d sa fe ty
Just as the Chinese government had deployed an impressive
arsenal in its fight against the SARS virus, so its public
acknowledgement of the contaminated milk crisis led to a
huge melamine hunt across the whole country. But in their
efforts at damage control, the experts uncovered the full
extent of the problem. The first need was to manage the
large influx of parents bringing an increasing number of poi-
soned children into the hospitals. The experts had no idea
of the effects of melamine on the human body, or of the best
methods of treatment, since previous experiments involving
the administration of large doses had only been conducted
on rats. (16) All they could do was recommend rest while wait-
ing for the kidneys to eliminate the toxins. The next need
was to test all foodstuffs containing milk; but as food safety
tests had never been used to test for melamine, the safety
inspections office had to introduce a new range of inspection
procedures, (17) and these revealed the full extent of the con-
tamination. Out of 491 samples of powdered milk from 109
milk product firms, 69 contained varying doses of
melamine. (18) Then Starbucks announced the withdrawal of
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7. At first the French media tended to mentioned “melanin,” a mildly toxic product found
in suntan cream.
8. www.cite-sciences.fr : “Mélamine: Retour sur le scandale du lait frelaté.” No French
reader could fail to notice the similarity with the growth hormones affair, which had legal
proceedings taking place in France at the same time.
9. In an interview published by the journal Science on 17 October 2008, Premier Wen
Jiabao declared that “Although problems occurred at the company, the government also
has a responsibility. (...) It is absolutely impermissible to sacrifice people’s lives and
health in exchange for temporary economic development. Food, all food, must meet
international standards.”
10. SCMP, 30 September 2008, “Police in Hebei seize melamine in farm raids”; SCMP, 11
October 2008: “Key melamine producer arrested in Hebei,” and “Punishment up to
death for breaking dairy laws.”
11. SCMP, 20 September 2008, “Shanghai dairy giant apologises.”
12. SCMP, 23 September 2008, “Milk scandal fells product safety chief.”
13. SCMP, 4 October 2008, “Taiwanese health minister resigns after lawmakers’ fracas over
milk scare.”
14. Aujourd’hui la Chine, 3 October, 2008, “RSF accuse l’OMS de légèreté dans le scandale
du lait en Chine.”
15. SCMP, 23 October 2008, “WHO criticises food safety system.”
16. SCMP, 21 November 2008, “No consensus on treating kidney stones in infants.”
17. SCMP, 9 October 2008, “The probability gap.”
18. SCMP, 17 September 2008, “Tests find tainted baby milk at 21 more firms.”
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all milk products from their outlets, and the substitution of
soya milk (19) -- before further tests showed that soya might
also contain melamine. (20) In late November, the US Food
and Drug Administration offered expert help to the Chinese
government after discovering excessive quantities of
melamine (over one part per million) in the products of
three leading firms: Abbott, Nestlé, and Mead Johnson. (21)
The British company Cadbury recalled 11 of its products
manufactured in China after conducting its own tests but
without making the results public. (22)
Hong Kong resumed the role of public health defender that
it had played during the SARS crisis, through recourse to
the institutions it had established at that time. The Centre
for Health Protection attempted to relieve the threat of over-
crowding in Chinese hospitals by designating 18 clinics for
kidney examinations, and by setting up a hotline, which
received more than 10,000 calls. (23) It uncovered thirteen
suspected cases, but no instances of mortality. The Centre
for Food Safety tested all milk products imported from
China to see whether they exceeded the limit of 2.5 parts
per million adopted by the Hong Kong government at the
beginning of the crisis. It discovered excessive melamine in
Mai-lai, a popular dessert sold in Maxim’s outlets, and in a
yoghurt ice cream made by Yili. But by launching such an
enquiry, the Hong Kong government set off another alarm.
On 25 October, the Centre for Food Safety announced that
some eggs imported from Dalian had shown positive results
in tests for melamine. (24) Given Hong Kong’s permanent
state of alert against avian flu over the previous decade, this
contamination in chicken farms could only raise further sus-
picion. (25) The issue of live poultry farms, which is very sen-
sitive in Hong Kong, gave rise to a disagreement with the
Chinese government over the best methods for testing chick-
ens. (26) Other tests were carried out on fish, and they pro-
duced negative results despite the presence of melamine in
the food used in fish farms. (27) In the SCMP letter columns,
a biochemistry professor at the City University voiced his
worries about the presence of melamine in pork, the princi-
pal meat consumed in China, but no official test confirmed
his suspicions.
The detection of melamine in eggs showed that the contam-
ination was not restricted to babies’ milk formulae but affect-
ed the entire food chain, and especially animal feed. (28) It
was then recalled that in the US in 2007 an excessively high
death rate among dogs was linked to the presence of
melamine in dog food, and this, compounded by accusations
of corruption, had led to the execution of the director of the
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine. This revelation coincided with a rumour spread
on the Internet criticising the dual system in the Chinese
milk trade: a separate “special food distribution centre
belonging to the State Council” was alleged to enable lead-
ing Chinese functionaries to consume products free of all
contamination.“ (29) In Hong Kong, shops selling milk prod-
ucts imported from abroad (particularly from Australia and
New Zealand) experienced increased sales. In Europe, peo-
ple noted with relief that Chinese milk imports had been for-
bidden since 2002, and that only Bangladesh, Burma, and
Yemen imported any at all. (30)
These revelations suggest that contaminated milk may have
been channelled towards “second class” populations. China
was also strongly suspected of concealing complaints from
the parents of sick children in the run-up to the Olympic
Games, in order to present the image of a “harmonious soci-
ety” and to avoid worrying athletes over the quality of the
food they were given. But with the end of the Olympic
Games, the contaminated milk affair demonstrated once
again the deep inequalities that divide Chinese society. The
recourse to legal action presented opportunities for denounc-
ing these divisions.Res olv ing  the cr is i s  thro ughle gal  m e ans?
The trial of Tian Wenhua, which opened on 26 December
2008 in Shijiazhuang, is considered by many observers to
have focused on a scapegoat. This 67-year-old director of
Sanlu is described as a model family woman known for her
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19. SCMP, 20 September 2008, “Milk coffees off the menu at Starbucks — try soya.”
20. SCMP, 4 October 2008, “Minister cites fast expansion as scandal touches soya milk.”
21. SCMP, 27 November 2008, “Traces of Melamine found in US formula”; and 30
November 2008, “US sets limit for melamine in baby milk.”
22. SCMP, 21 December 2008, “Cadbury recalls 11 products after tests reveal melamine.”
23. SCMP, 23 September 2008, “Frustrated parents clamour for help as hospital battles to
cope.”
24. SCMP, 28 October 2008, “Boss of Dalian firm apologises over tainted eggs sent to HK.”
25. On 10 December 2008, an outbreak of avian flu was declared on a Hong Kong farm, the
first since 2003. The newspapers suspected that the virus had been spread by eggs
smuggled in from China.
26. SCMP, 5 November 2008, “HK, Mainland bodies clash on melamine tests.”
27. SCMP, 28 November 2008, “Melamine in fish food — but not in fish.” 
28. See Le Monde, 30 October 2008, “Suspicion spreads to the entire food chain.” In a study
published by the Chinese CDC, out of a sample of 2,000 children in Gansu, 17% were
suffering from kidney problems, and 10% of those children had never drunk milk from
Sanlu milk powder, which suggests another source of contamination. Cf. SCMP, 21
November 2008, “Kidney stone risk 30 times higher in China.”
29. http://caichongguo.blog.lemonde.fr/2008/09, “An internal network for distributing food-
stuffs to leading functionaries has been revealed.”
30. See www.afssa.fr, 2 December 2008, “Melamine and food products.”
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kindness and modesty. A former veterinary practitioner, she
managed in the course of 20 years to transform a small farm
into a leading profitable enterprise, eventually becoming the
chairperson of the Chinese Milk Industries Association. In
December, the Chinese government announced that
melamine contamination had killed six children and poi-
soned 300,000 more. The charge of the “manufacture and
sale of dangerous toxic food products” was replaced by the
“manufacture and sale of defective products,” which spared
Tian from facing the death penalty. Another 20 people
faced the same charges, including three members of the
Sanlu board, and six were accused of having produced and
sold “powdered protein” containing melamine. (31) The court
also considered Sanlu’s application for bankruptcy, which
was filed on 24 December. The prosecutor went over the
various warnings received by the enterprise from the begin-
ning of 2008: an internal investigation team had been set up
on 20 May, but on 13 August the board had decided to sell
products in which melamine had been detected. Tian
Wenhua pleaded guilty, but stated that she had informed the
local authorities. In fact, a meeting with the mayor of
Shijiazhuang on 2 August had led to the recall of the dan-
gerous products being postponed until after the Olympic
Games. (32)
However, the Shijiazhuang trial did not put an end to the
anger of the families, who were not allowed to attend. Since
the beginning of the crisis, the provincial authorities had dis-
couraged lawyers from representing the parents of the poi-
soned children. (33) Local health offices had resisted register-
ing children’s deaths as caused by the ingestion of milk pow-
der. In Hubei, doctors attributed a child’s death to inflam-
mation of the heart, and refused to carry out an autopsy for
which the parents, being migrant workers, were unable to
pay. (34) Families of children registered as cases of melamine
poisoning are entitled to substantial compensation, even if
the payments are not quite as high as their initial demands.
On 14 January 2009, the village couple from Gansu whose
child had died on 1 May 2008 and had become the first offi-
cially recognised fatality, received 200,000 yuan from Sanlu
on the condition that they renounce all further claims. On 5
May 2008 they had sued Sanlu for 1 million yuan, but that
claim had been thrown out. (35) Sanlu also offered 200,000
yuan to other parents whose children had died from milk
powder poisoning, 30,000 yuan to those whose children
were badly affected, and 2,000 yuan to those with lesser
complaints. The firm’s bankruptcy application on 24
December, however, cast doubts on the likelihood of that
compensation ever being paid. (36) More than 500 families of
affected children decided to seek damages through the
People’s Supreme Court in Beijing, demanding long-term
treatment for their children instead of immediate pay-outs, (37)
but the local authorities prevented the parents of sick chil-
dren from going to Beijing to lodge their complaint. (38) If the
government was able to promise compensation to foreign
companies importing Chinese milk, it could surely bear the
costs of meeting the same responsibility towards its own cit-
izens. (39) The legal burdens could be borne by the whole of
the chain for milk production and distribution.T he  t ra nsfor ma ti on o f  m il kp r oducti on i n  co nte mp or ar yChi na
Some reporters travelled to Inner Mongolia to interview milk
producers. This is the traditional cattle raising area that sup-
plies the milk for the industries based around Beijing. It has
small family-run dairy farms in which working conditions
have changed considerably over the last ten years. The
Chinese government has given strong backing to milk pro-
duction by providing subsidies for exports, and this has led
to a rise in the price of milk. In the words of Ji Weigui, cited
as an example of the newly rich who bought 20 cows to sell
on to other villagers, “Farmers know very little about the out-
side world; when the government told them to raise cattle,
they simply did what they were told.” According to a
Hohhot saying, “Raising one cow will feed the family; two
will pay for the children’s schooling; and three will give you
a new house.” Zhang Zilong, who has ten cows, has seen
the price of milk rise from 1.6 yuan per kilo in 1993 to its
current level of 2.9 yuan. But the profit margin is low (at
about 0.2 yuan per kilo of milk sold) because a cow’s daily
consumption is 15 kg of factory-produced feed (the price of
which has risen from 0.8 yuan per kg to its current 2 yuan)
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31. On 22 January, three of these six were condemned to death, and Tian Wenhua was given
a life sentence, without any politician being charged. This confirms yet again the old
adage, “Kill the cock to frighten the monkey.”
32. Caijing, 15 January 2009, “The Sanlu Trial: Diary of a Dairy Disaster.”
33. SCMP, 23 September 2008, “Lawyers warned to shun milk suits.”
34. SCMP, 11 December 2008, “Hubei officials deny baby’s death linked to tainted formu-
la.”
35. Chinaview,16 January 2008, “Parents of dead child accept compensation after China
tainted milk scandal.”
36. SCMP, 26 December 2008, “Sanlu victims’ compensation under threat.”
37. Associated Press, 19 January 2009, “213 China families take milk case to highest
court.”
38. SCMP, 22 January 2009, “Parents detained ahead of verdict in melamine trial.”
39. SCMP, 11 October 2008, “Beijing promises to help foreign firms get compensation.”
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and 20 kg of grass (which costs around 0.2 yuan per kg). (40)
Consequently, there was an acceptance of the practice of
setting aside milk with low protein content to have melamine
added to it, even though the operation itself was carried out
after the milk was passed on from the producer to the indus-
trialist. (41) That is why the decision by the large industrialists
to cease purchasing milk for the time being, and to discard
the low protein milk, has brought turmoil to this fragile local
economy, whose balance was already shifting under the
pressures of rising demand.
The contaminated milk affair also throws light on changing
patterns among consumers. The poisoned babies tended to
be the children of migrant workers, who were given milk
made from powder with added nutritional value to compen-
sate for the absence of their mothers. The SCMP did not
carry reports about milk feeding practices, but the readers’
columns contained several conventional calls for a return to
breastfeeding, taking no account of the living conditions of
the families implicitly criticised. There was also a startling
article announcing that Chinese scientists at the State
Biotechnical Laboratory for Agriculture had genetically
modified some cows in a way that enabled them to produce
a protein normally found only in mother’s milk, without
incurring the need for chemical additives. (42) This “discov-
ery” has not been followed up.
In his book entitled The Food of China, the anthropologist
Eugene Anderson raises the question of why, in the course
of their history, the Chinese have developed cattle breeding
less than other forms of breeding. He sets aside the often
cited biological argument that Chinese do not possess lac-
tase, an enzyme that enables the digestion of milk after
weaning. A more sociological argument rests on the Chinese
mistrust of the cows of Central Asia, which they associate
with the alien and threatening neighbours who own them.
He argues that “the Chinese have never been fond of milk
products; but from the Wei through to the Tang periods,
strong influences from Central Asia made dairy products
more widely used. Under the Song dynasty, when the cen-
tre of power was in the Southeast (where influences from
Central Asia had been minimal) and when the dynasties
from the Altaic mountains were considered as enemies, milk
products were marks of the barbarian.“ (43) But Anderson ulti-
mately relies on a third, more ecological, argument: the
Chinese give primacy to the raising of pigs and chickens
because these require little space and feed on human left-
overs, whereas cows are costly in terms of both space and
fodder. He argues that “given China’s environment, which is
not only bad for raising cattle but also for keeping milk even
when preserved as yoghurt and cheese, milk processing was
too difficult, expensive and dangerous.“ (44) So the main aim
of those who did raise cattle was to use them for ploughing,
and this led to their being represented not as abundant
sources of milk and meat, but as faithful working compan-
ions, who should not to be eaten. (45)
This enables us to understand why the contaminated milk
affair triggered such a scandal. The health crisis brought to
light a change in the practices of production and consump-
tion, which those involved had been vaguely aware of, but
which had not appeared problematic until then. In order for
the poisoning of children through the drinking of milk to
appear truly “impermissible,” to quote Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao, there had to be not only the introduction of a toxic
agent, but also an existing suspicion about the quality of the
product in circulation. The meaning of a health crisis
depends on the way in which the poles of production and
consumption, already increasingly separated by the industri-
al system, came to appear as contradictory opposites in the
collective modes of representation. The contaminated milk
affair achieved such notoriety because the conditions for the
production and the consumption of milk in contemporary
China (established on the model of the dairy industry in the
West, plus the development of milk formula on the basis of
the distance of the migrant workers from their children) re-
awakened traditional suspicions towards milk. This is just a
hypothesis, but it might explain why this scandal managed to
shake Chinese society at a deeper level than the purely polit-
ical outrage provoked by its international revelation, even
though that was its initial cause. This hypothetical explana-
tion would need to be supported by a study of the particular
forms used to express moral outrage, in order to see how
they serve to perpetuate the initial political criticism.
A comparison with the infected blood scandal could give fur-
ther support to this hypothesis. Blood transfusions were con-
sidered by the Chinese authorities to be the source of a new
kind of profitability and were not regarded with suspicion
before the scandal broke. (46) That might be a reason (added
the fact that Chinese blood was not sold abroad) why the
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40. SCMP, 23 September 2008, “Dairy producers fear dark days ahead in aftermath of
scare.”
41. SCMP,20 September 2008, “Dirty secret of milk-faking capital.”
42. SCMP, 20 October 2008, “Super-cows to give mothers’ milk.”
43. E. Anderson, The Food of China, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 66.
44. Ibid., p. 146.
45. See V. Goossaert, L’interdit du boeuf en Chine: Agriculture, éthique et sacrifice, Paris,
Bibliothèque de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 2005.
46. See P. Haski, Le Sang de la Chine, Paris, Grasset, 2005.
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scandal did not reach the proportions of a full-blown affair,
and why its development was restricted regionally, being sup-
pressed by the local authorities. In this respect, the situation
was the mirror image of that in France. In France, it was the
national blood transfusion system that was suspect, as the
sale of blood had been introduced under the German occu-
pation, and the Resistance had condemned it by proclaim-
ing the values of voluntary donation. (47) Milk, on the other
hand, has been consistently promoted within the policy of
state subsidies for cattle farming – allowing the cow to
become one of the symbolic animals of rural France. That is
why the crisis over mad cow disease was seen in France as
a repetition of the contaminated blood affair: the safety
measures for the protection of the blood supply simply need-
ed to be transferred to the food chain, which was considered
essentially pure. (48) One hopes that in China the reverse
phenomenon may occur. The government may be able to
strengthen its fight against AIDS on the basis of its mobili-
sation of resources over the contaminated milk affair. More
broadly, it may turn out that the health crises linked to the
changes in cattle farming may bring out critical responses
already available in Chinese culture, such as the vegetarian
values rooted in Buddhism, for example. Therefore, we
should not invoke a “culture of secrecy” peculiar to China;
every culture produces its health crises in accordance with its
economic mechanisms and its collective modes of represen-
tation.•
• Translated by Jonathan Hall
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47. See M. A. Hermitte, Le sang et le droit: Essai sur la transfusion sanguine,
Paris, Seuil, 1996.
48. See M. Hirsch et al., L’affolante affaire de la vache folle, Paris, Balland,
1996.
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Chrono logy  of  the  Co nt am ina te dMil k  Affa ir
Th e  su p pres s ion  of  the  s ca n dal :
March 2008: first complaints from parents of children who had
become ill after taking Sanlu milk formula
5 May: first legal action against the Sanlu Group is rejected by the
courts
20 May: Sanlu sets up an internal investigation team
2 August: Fonterra informs the Shijiazhuang authorities of the need
to withdraw Sanlu milk powder from the market
13 August: Sanlu decides to continue sale of the suspect milk products
Th e sc an da l  br eaks :
5 September: Fonterra informs the New Zealand government of the
health problems linked to Chinese milk
8 September: the Hebei provincial government is informed about the
problem
10 September: official Chinese media carry reports about sick babies
11 September: Sanlu recalls all products manufactured before 6 August 
13 September: the Ministry of Health compels Sanlu to recall all prod-
ucts based on milk powder
23 September: the director of the AQSIQ resigns
17 October: the journal Science publishes Wen Jiabao’s statement
labelling the food contamination “impermissible“
23 October: the WHO criticises China’s food safety system
Th e exper ts a re  c all ed  in :
20 September: Starbucks removes all milk products from its outlets
25 October: the Hong Kong Centre for Food Safety detects
melamine in eggs imported from China
30 November: the US Food and Drug Administration offers assis-
tance to the Chinese government
21 December: Cadbury recalls 11 milk products made in China
Th e lega l  pr oc eedin gs :
24 December: Sanlu files for bankruptcy
26 December: the trial of Tian Wenhua and 20 other defendants
opens in Shijiazhuang
14 January: the parents of the first official victim of melamine poison-
ing accept Sanlu’s compensation package
19 January: 213 families with sick children lodge their complaint with
the Supreme Court in Beijing
22 January: Tian Wenhua receives a life sentence, and three
melamine manufacturers get the death penalty.
